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IMPLIED WARRANTY OF QUALITY UNDER THE
UNIFORM SALES ACT
GENERA&LLY
The Uniform Sales Act was adopted by the legislature of the
state of Washington m the extraordinary session of 1925. This
act, patterned after similar legislation previously enacted in Eng-
land, is designed to bring the law of the different states into con-
formity To effect this purpose the draughtsmen of the act largely
codified the common law, but even where such a course was fol-
lowed it is inevitable that the pre-existing law of some jurisdic-
tions must be overruled. It is the purpose of the present dis-
cussion to consider the provisions of the Sales Act relative to
implied warranty of quality in order to determine the proper inter-
pretation to be given thereto, and then in the light of such prin-
ciples to note the effect on the Washington law as previously an-
nounced by the Supreme Court of this state. Resort must be had
for purposes of construction to the English and American cases
construing the respective acts, since as yet no case involving this
portion of the act has been decided in the state of Washington
and the cases decided previously are in numerous instances value-
less as authority under the Sales Act.
The law of inplied warranty of quality, applicable to sales other
than those by sample, is set forth in see. 15 of the Uniform Sales
Act as follows.
Subject to the provisions of this act and of any statute
in that behalf, there is no inplied warranty or condition
as to the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of
goods supplied under a contract to sell or a sale, except
as follows:
(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication,
makes known to the seller the particular purpose for
which the goods are required, and it appears that the
buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether
he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an
implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit
for such purpose.
(2) Where the goods are bought by description from
a seller who deals in goods of that description (whether
he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an
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implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable
quality
(3) If the buyer has examined the goods, there is no
implied warranty as regards defects which such examina-
tion ought to have revealed.
(4) In the case of a contract to sell or a sale of a speci-
fied article under its patent or other trade name, there
is no implied warranty as to its fitness for any particular
purpose.
(5) An implied warranty or condition as to the qual-
ity or fitness for a particular purpose may be annexed
by the usage of trade.
(6) An express warranty or condition does not negative
a warranty or condition implied under this act unless
inconsistent therewith.
It is apparent that the act purports to apply to all "goods"
without discrimination as to kind, that such is its scope was early
decided in the English case of Walls v. Russell.1 Also, by the lan-
guage of the introductory paragraph, it extends to "goods supplied
under a contract to sell or a sale," and this language has been held
broad enough to support a warranty of quality of bottles, which
contained mineral water sold to the plaintiff, although the bottles
were returnable and not actually a part of the subject matter of
the sale.
2
Likewise, this section extends to all persons selling goods, except
that the second subsection is limited to dealers in the goods sold
The first subsection of the English act is not so broad as the cor
responding subsection of the American act, it requires that the
article be one which it is "the seller's business to supply "3 Both
acts definitely wipe out any distinction that may previously have
existed between sales by manufacturers and sales by dealers.
Warranties existing under this section find their source, in the
final analysis, in the factor of justifiable reliance by the buyer on
the seller. The necessity of reliance is expressly stated in the first
subsection, and the other subsections clearly owe their existence
to the same principle. The importance of keeping this in mind
cannot be over-emphasized.
Warranties can be implied only under subsections 1, 2 and 5.
Subsections 3 and 4 state certain cases in which no warranty
12 Ir. K. B. 585 C. A. (1902)
2GeUddling v. Marsh, 1 K. B. 668, 89 L. J. K. B. 526, 36 T. L. R. 337
(1920).
3 Ch. 71 of 56 and 57 Victoria.
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shall be implied, and subsection 6 merely recognizes that an im-
plied warranty may exist along with-an express warranty, provid-
mg that the two are not inconsistent. Subsections 2, 3, 5 and 6
furnish but little difficulty of construction. The other subsec-
tions, 1 and 4, have proved the most fruitful sources of litigation,
chiefly by reason of the use of the words "particular purpose."
To these two subsections must go the major portion of considera-
tion in this article.
With the foregoing principles in mind, there remains to be deter-
mined the all-important question-n what cases does the act raise
a warranty and in what ones does the rule of caveat emptor apply9
To the end of answering this question, each subsection will be
considered separately
Fr TNms Fo KNowN PURPOSE
The first subsection provides in substance that the goods are
warranted reasonably fit for the particular purpose for which
they are required, where such purpose is made known to the seller
and the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment. The con-
struction of the words "particular purpose" affords the chief
difficulty under this subsection. If they are to be so strictly con-
strued as to mean some purpose of the buyer, different from the
ordinary or general use-of the article, the scope of the act is greatly
restricted. This subsectibn is the only one under which it is pos-
sible to find a warranty of a specific article. Consequently, if a
strict interpretation be given to the words quoted, those who pur-
chase such articles as automobiles, clothing or food merely for
purposes for which such goods are ordinarily used will be without
remedy should the goods prove defective. Such buyers would be
compelled to further particularize their intended purpose in order
to raise any warranty, and the warranty so raised would neces-
sarily be one of limited scope. In brief, such a view would entirely
exclude the common law warranty of merchantable quality in the
sale of a specific article. Where the sale is by description, the
right to such a warranty is, of course, assured by subsection 2.
Happily, the words "particular purpose" in this subsection have
received a broader construction than suggested above, both from
the English and the American courts.4 According to these cases,
'Great Britain: Wallis v. Russell, Note 1, supra, Pretst V. Last, 2
K. B. 148 -C. A. (1903) Drummond v. Van Ingen, 12 A.- C. 284 (1887)
(prior to Sale of Goods Act) Thompson v Sears & Co., Se. L. T. 221
(1926). United States: Minneapolis Steel etc. Co. v. Casey Land Agency,
51 N. D. 832, 201 N. W 172 (1924) Keenan v. Cherry 4 Webb. 47 R. I.
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
a particular purpose means any purpose, communicated to the
seller, for which the buyer desires the goods.' So where an article
has by its very nature but a single common use, the buyer need not
particularize his needs in order to raise a warranty of fitness for
such use.6 In such a case the common use is the "particular pur
pose", and the warranty for this purpose incidentally happens to
be identical with the common law warranty of merchantability
Where, however, the article sold may be put to a variety of uses,
the buyer must, expressly or by implication, inform the seller of
his special purpose if he wishes to have the benefit of an implied
warranty of fitness for that purpose. The rules announced in tins
and the preceding paragraph are brought out most aptly in the
English case of Preist v. Last7 in the opinion of Collins, M. R.,
who said
There are many goods which have in themselves no
special or peculiar efficacy for any one particular pur-
pose, but are capable of general use for a multitude of
purposes. In case of a purchase of goods of that kind, in
order to give rise to the implication of warranty, it is
necessary to show that though the article sold was capable
of general use for many purposes, in the particular case it
was sold with reference to a particular purpose. But in a
case where the discussion begins with the fact that the
description of the goods, by which they are sold, points to
one particular purpose only, it seems to me that the first
requirement of the subsection is satisfied, namely that the
particular purpose for which the goods are sold is made
known to the seller.
Illustrative of cases of the first type referred to by this judge
would be the sale of goods of such general character as steel and
lumber. Unless the buyer particularizes the use to which he in-
125, 131 Atl. 309 (1925). To the same effect without a detailed considera-
tion of the question are: Great Britain: Sproule v. Triumph Cycle Co.,
N. Ir. 83 C. A. (Ir.) (1927) United States: Linen Thread Co. v. Shaw.
9 F (2d) 17 (1925) Mandel Bros. v. Mulvey, 230 Ill. App. 588 (1923)
Flynn v. Bedell Co., 242 Mass. 450, 136 N. E. 252 (1922) Ward v. Great
Atlantic Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 120 N. E. 225, 5 A. L. R. 342 (1918)
Parker v. Shaghalian, 244 Mass. 19, 138 N. E. 236 (1923) Ward v. Valker
44 N. D. 598, 176 N. W 129 (1920) Sharpsville Boiler Works v. Petroleum
Go., 23 Ohio App. 319, 156 N. E. 149 (1927) Lampman Werts Corp. v.
Olneyville Co., 140 Atl. 6 (R. I.) (1928) Suggesting the stricter view are:
Bonwit v. Kinlen, 150 N. Y. S. 966 (1914) Meyer v. Cleveland Packard
Motor Go., 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N. E. 118 (1922).
Wallis v. Russell, note 1. supra.
'Note 4, supra.
' Note 4, supra.
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tends to put such goods, no warranty, it seems, could arise under
tis subsection. Because of the very nature of such goods, in all
but the rarest cases the sale will be by description, and a warranty
of merchantable quality implied under the second subsection. The
second class of cases mentioned in the above quotation is illustrated
by sales of wearing apparel,8 food,0 motor vehicles, 10 and like
articles, in all of which cases it has been held that a warranty of
fitness for purposes of common use was to be implied under the first
subsection. It is of course possible that the buyer may wish to use
such articles as these for some special purpose of Ins own, for in-
stance, he may desire an article of food suitable for cooking in a
certain way If he informs the seller of this purpose, and relies
on his judgment in the matter, a warranty of fitness for the latter
purpose arises, at the same time the other warranty (that is, that
the article is a proper item of food) remains unaffected thereby
An examination of the decided cases leads merely to tls: That
where the dealings and circumstances inform the seller of any pur-
pose of the buyer in purchasing the goods, there is an implied war-
ranty of fitness for such ,purpose under this subsection, and that
where the seller is entirely uninformed as to any purpose of the
buyer, the doctrine of caveat emptor applies, subject always, of
course, to the qualification that in sales by description by dealers
there is an implied warranty of merchantability under subsection
2. The principles announced in these cases have the approval of
the foremost text writers in this country and in England.11 and
seem to express a common sense interpretation of the scope of the
words "particular purpose" as used in the first subsection.
It is not to be inferred from what has been said that a general
warranty of merchantable quality as such arises under subsection
1, although statements to that effect are occasionally found. The
only warranty possible under this subsection is one for a "par
ticular purpose." As has already been pointed out, the particular
purpose of the buyer may be the same as the general purpose for
which the goods are designed, where this is true, the warranty of
fitness for the particular purpose does not differ in practical
'Thompson v. Sears & Co., note 4, supra, Keenan v. cherry, note 4,
supra, Mandel Bros. v. Mulvey, note 4, supra, Flynn v. Bedell Co., note 4,
supra.
'Wallis v. Russell, note 1, supra.
20 Sproule v. Tnumph Cycle Co, note 4, supra.
BENJAMIN ON SALES, (6th ed.), pp. 715, 716; WILLISTw ON SALES,
(2d ed.) pp. 500, 501.
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effect from a general warranty of merchantable quality, but tech-
nically it remains a warranty of the former class.
Reference has already been made to the fact that the seller
must be informed of the buyer's purpose to bring a case within
this subsection. Such information may be conveyed expressly or
by implication, whether it has been conveyed is only a question of
fact in any case. Where the buyer relies on express words, his
problem is simply one of proof. As to the implication of knowledge
on the part of the seller, all facts surrounding the transaction are
to be considered as a basis for the finding,12 and the fact that there
is a formal written contract is immaterial if an implied warranty
is not thereby expressly excluded.1 3
Next it is necessary that the buyer show reliance on the seller's
skill or judgment under this subsection. This again is a question
of fact, the determination of which depends on such circum-
stances as the opportunity for inspection, the nature of the defect
(whether latent or patent) and the comparative skill of the parties.
The latent character of the defect does not relieve the seller if
the buyer was entitled for other reasons to rely on him.'4
In concluding the discussion of this subsection, it is to be noted
that the goods need not be of the highest quality, it being suffi-
cient if they are "reasonably fit" for the designated purpose.
WARRANTY IN SALES BY DESCRIPTION
Subsection 2 provides that where goods are bought by descrip-
tion from a dealer, they are impliedly warranted to be of mer
chantable quality The rule announced obliges the seller, upon
whom selection of the goods rests, to supply goods of sound quality
without regard to any knowledge on his part as to the buyer's
particular purpose. Little difficulty should be encountered from
this subsection, since its language seems entirely unambiguous and
it is declaratory of the general common law It is to be noted that
it is to be limited to sales by dealers. It has been suggested that
this limitation operates only where the goods are actually
"bought," and that therefore sellers other than dealers cannot per
form their contracts to sell by tendering or delivering unmerchant-
"Parker v. Shaghalian, note 4, supra.
3 United States: Parker v. Shaghalian, note 4, supra, Sampson v. Pals,
199 App. Div. 854, 192 N. Y. S. 538 (1922) Dexter d Carpenter v. Bliss
Bldg. Go., 123 Misc. 379, 205 N. Y. S. 412 (1924). Great Britain: Jacobs v.
Scott, 2 Fraser, Sc. 70 (1899).
"Ward v. Great AtN. Tea Co., note 4, supra.
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able goods.15 This proposition is undoubtedly correct as a general
principle of contract law, and furthermore seems to be expressly
provided for in see. 14 of the Sales Act.' 6
"Merchantable quality" is an expression familiar to the com-
mon law, and the various definitions which it has received in the
decided cases furish the sole basis for its determination under
the Sales Act. It would unnecessarily extend the length of this
discussion to review those cases here, but in general it may be
said that to be merchantable goods need not be of the first quality
on the one hand nor may they merely be of medium quality on the
other, but that they shall at least be salable in the market as goods
of the kind that they supposed or purport to be."
One .other important question arises under this subsection. Does
it extend to sales under "a patent or other trade name" referred
to in subsection 4? This question will be considered in connection
with the discussion of the latter subsection.
EFFECT OF INSPECTION AND OPPORTUNITY TO INSPECT
Subsection 3 provides that where the buyer has examined the
goods, there is no implied warranty as to such defects as the exami-
nation ought to have revealed. Like the preceding subsection, the
language here is quite unambiguous. The exclusion of a warranty
as to obvious defects is in keeping with the general idea of the
necessity of justifiable reliance on the seller's judgment which per-
vades the entire section. In this connection it is to be noted that
it is not necessary that the buyer actually observe the defects, it
is sufficient if the examination should have revealed them to him.
The limitation of the effect of inspection to obvious defects
changes the law of a number of American jurisdictions which held
the view that inspection precluded the rights of the buyer regard-
less of the fact that the defect was latent. However, the rule laid
down by this subsection of the act seems to be the saner one in view
of the principle of justifiable reliance already adverted to and the
fact that a warranty is not based on fault on the part of the seller. 8
The examination referred to must, of course, be one prior to or
-WILLISTOIN ON SALES, (2d ed.) p. 499.
"Rem. Comp. Stat., 1927 Supp., sec. 5836-14. (No detailed consideration
of this section is given in this article.)
'
7 WILWSTON ON SALES, (2d ed.), p. 486, sec. 243 and cases there cited.
1 WmmnsoN ON SALES, (2d ed.), p. 466, sec. 237. But see U. S. Fid-eflty
& Guaranty Co. v. Western Iron Stoves Co., - Wis. - 220 N. W 192
(1928) where this fundamental rule of the law of warranty was entirely
disregarded.
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contemporaneous with the making of the bargain. After that time
the buyer is entitled to accept such goods as are delivered and re-
cover his damages for breach of warranty by the seller.19
Perhaps the most noteworthy fact concerning this subsection is
that it uses the words "has examined," which if strictly construed
would make opportunity to examine, without actual examination,
unimportant. In the few cases where the question has arisen, how
ever, the words have been liberally construed so as to include oppor-
tunity to examine.20 Actually this does violence to the language of
the act, but the result at least seems a salutary one.
In any case, regardless of the operation of this subsection, inspec-
tion or opportunity for inspection is evidence of want of reliance
by the buyer on the seller.21
WARRANTY OF GOODS SOLD UNDER A PATENT OR TRADE NAME
Subsection 4 provides that in case of a contract to sell or a sale of
goods under their patent or other trade name, there shall be no war
ranty for any particular purpose. The recurrence of the words
''particular purpose" in this subsection raises the question as to
whether the general warranty of merchantability is also excluded.
It would seem the better view that such is not the case. It is con-
ceded that this subsection was intended as a limitation on subsection
1,22 and in fact it is expressly made so in the English act. Also it
was intended as a restatement of the common law rule applicable to
the sale of a known, defined and described article.21 Under the
latter rule it was felt that the buyer could not be said to have relied
on the seller to furnish something fit for the buyer's particular pur
pose, but the common law cases almost uniformly held that the seller
warranted the goods to be merchantable. 24 Thus, if the common law
is to be followed in this regard there seems no reason for denying the
"UNIFORM SALES ACT, see. 49; Rem. Comp. Stat., 1927 Supp., sec.
5836-49.
20 Great Britain: Thornett v. Beers, 1 K. B. 486 (1919). United States:
Rosenbush v. Learned, 242 Mass. 297, 136 N. E. 341 (1922) Dunbar Bros.
Co. v. Consolidated Iron Steel Mfg. Co., 23 F (2d) 417 (1928) (construing
Conn. act).
"Keenan v. Cherry d Webb, note 4, supra.
"Aetna Chemical Co. v. Spaulding, etc., Co., 98 Vt. 51, 126 Ati. 582
(1925).
"WILLISTON ON SALES, (2d ed.). p. 500.
Kaull v. Blacker 107 Kan. 578, 193 Pac. 182 (1920) Flaherty v. Maine
Motor Carniage Co., 117 Me. 376, 104 AtI. 627 (1918) Appalachian Powc,"
Co. v. Tate, 90 W Va. 428, 111 S. E. 150 (1922). Contra. Ivans v. Laury,
67 N. J. L. 153, 50 AtI. 355 (1901)
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buyer the benefit of a warranty of merchantable quality Certainly
there seems nothing in the language of this subsection repugnant to
such a holding.
However this may be, it seems that the same result should be pro-
vided for in subsection 2. On principle there seems no reason why
a sale by patent or trade name should not be a form of sale by
description. The expression "sale by description" is in no way
limited in subsection 2. Thus conceding that the fourth subsection
is a limitation on subsection 1, its effect is merely to prevent war-
ranties other than those of merchantable quality By thus inter-
preting the scope of this subsection, no violence is done to the inter-
pretation of the words "particular purpose" in subsection 1 as con-
strued earlier in this article. To illustrate the harmony of subsec-
tions 1, 2 and 4 in this respect, let us consider, for instance, a sale
of shoes. Under subsection 1 the buyer of shoes would impliedly
inform the seller that he desired them for the particular purpose
of wearing them. If it was then further found that buyer relied
on.the seller's judgment, an implied warranty of fitness for pur-
poses of general wear would arise. It happens that this warranty
would be identical with the general warranty of merchantable qual-
ity But suppose further that the buyer desires shoes which will
aid or protect some deformity of the feet, informs the seller of his
purpose and relies on the latter's judgment. This would be a par-
ticular purpose also, but one not identical with the general purpose
of the goods, and here again there would be a warranty under the
first subsection. Now suppose that the buyer demanded a certain
brand of shoe by its patent name. Then, regardless of whether he
added a statement of his purpose or not, there would, considering
only subsections 1 and 4, be no warranty for any purpose whatever.
Here, however, subsection 2 comes into operation (conceding the
sale to be by description) and unequivocally says that the goods are
warranted to be of merchantable quality, in brief, as subsection 4
qualifies subsection 1, so also does subsection 2 in effect qualify
subsection 4.
The foregoing argument is based on reasoning submitted as cor-
rect on principle. As yet there is but a small body of judicial author-
ity directly supporting it,25 and still less authority holding directly
2Great Britain: Bristol Tramways & Carriage Co. v. Fiat Motors, 2
K. B. 831 (1910) gumner Permain & CJo. w. Webb & Co., 1 K. B. 55 (1922).
United States: McNiez d Higgns v. Czarnikow-Rienda, 274 F 397 (1921)
(per Learned Hand, J.) Raymond Syndicate v. American Radio Corp.,
(Mass.) 160 N. E. 821 (1928). To the same effect without an express con-
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the opposite view2" among the cases construing the Sales Act. It is
submitted that the latter cases (neither decided by the court of final
resort of the jurisdiction) are not sound on principle and neither
cites any cases in support of its proposition.
The next question presented involves the definition of the expres-
sion "patent or other trade name." No dispute can reasonably be
expected to arise as to the meaning of the term "patent name," but
the more general term "trade name" has received judicial defini-
tion. In Barrett Co. v. Panther Rubber Mfg. Co.,2i a trade name
was said to be one by which the goods are known in the market and
among those familiar with goods of that kind. But a general name,
such as "high speed steel," 28 applicable to a certain grade of goods
sold by all dealers, at least some of whom have an additional private
name for their brand, is not a trade name. Also there is authority
for the proposition that the name must have some standing in point
of time to be a trade name within the meaning of this subsection.2 9
Some argument might perhaps be predicated on these latter eases.
but in general it may be said that a trade name is construed to mean
some known and recognized name of distinctive character given to
the goods by their manufacturer or seller.
The fact that goods having a patent or trade name are bought is
not sufficient to bring this subsection into operation. It is further
necessary that the sale be made under a patent or trade name. Just
when a sale or a contract to sell is of this sort sometimes presents a
difficult question. Often this question will be one of fact only, but
in some cases it develops into one of law and fact. Where a written
contract is drawn up, describing the goods by a patent or trade name,
the subsection will apply so as to exclude a warranty for a particular
purpose." By such a contract the seller has bound himself to fur-
nish a definite article, and there is no opportunity left for him to
sideration of the question is Parker v. Shaghalian, 244 Mass. 19, 138 N. E.
236 (1923). But see Stoehner etc. Corp. v. Greenburg, 250 Mass. 550, 146
N. E. 34 (1925), where the general purpose and particular purpose were
the same and the court in refusing warranty for the latter apparently
overlooked the possibility of warranty of merchantable quality. Also see
the following articles in legal periodicals in accord with the view here
taken: 11 Minn. L. R. 497 by Frank L. Mechem, 10 Corn. L. Q. 521, 23
Mich. L. R. 805.
"Santa Rosa Vallejo Tanning Co. v. Kronauer & Co., 228 Ill. App.
236 (1923) Empire Cream Separator Co. v. Quinn. 184 App. Div. 304, 171
N. Y. S. 413 (1918)
'24 F (2d) 329 (1928).
Griffin et al. v. Metal Product Co., 264 Pa. 254, 107 At. 713 (1919).
2 Stroock & Co. v. Lichtenthal, 229 N. Y. S. 371 (1928).
30 Folsom v. Boston Consolidated Gas Co., 237 Mass. 565, 130 N. E. 197
(1921) Matteson v. Lagace, 36 R. I. 223, 89 Atl. 713 (1914)
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exercise his judgment as to its fitness for the buyer's particular pur-
pose. The same will be true, of course, in an oral transaction where
the buyer has asked for an article of a certain brand, but where the
buyer takes the goods on the basis of the seller's recommendation
and not because of any reliance on the brand of the goods, the courts
have reached the opposite result.31 Other snilar cases doubtless
may arise and be disposed of in accordance with these principles.
The importance of tins subsection is apparent in this day of wide-
spread advertising when so many articles are known and sold
by name. 'While the exclusion of certain classes of warranties will
no doubt be generally salutary in effect, it is equally important that
the application of this subsection be confined within its proper
limits.
EFFECT OF USAGE OF TRADE
Subsection 5 provides that a warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose may be annexed by usage of trade. On its face this subsec-
tion is quite clear, but some pertinent observations may be made
regarding it.
Prior to the act a number of American courts, including the
Supreme Court of the United States,3 2 held that trade usage was not
competent to establish a warranty Clearly this subsection changes
the law of those states.
To bring this subsection into operation, the usage must be known
to both parties, or if unknown to one, the other must be justified in
assuming knowledge on the part of the man with whom he deals.3
Usage supports a warranty simply because the parties have intended
that a rule different from the usual one would apply'by reason of
the known custom. Naturally there could be no such intention unless
the parties were aware of the custom at the time the contract to
sell or sale was made. But even though one party actually is ignorant
of the custom he will be bound by it if he should have known, and
the other party acted on the justifiable assumption that he did
know.
This subsection provides only for the smplicatson of a warranty,
it says nothing of the effect of a usage not to warrant. Proof of
such usage to destroy a warranty that otherwise might be implied
nBachter v. Gulf Refinzng CJo., 203 N. Y. S. 769 (1923) Ireland v.
Liggett Co., 243 Mass. 243, 137 N. E. 371 (1922). But see Netgenfind v.
Singer, 227 fli. App. 493 (1923).
'2Barnar v Kellogg, 10 Wall. 383, 19 L. Ed. 987 (1871).
-WILLSTON O SALES, (2d ed.), see. 246.
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would doubtless be proper. So far as this subsection is concerned,
there is nothing prohibiting such a showing, consequently if the
common law on this matter were to be applied, those jurisdictions
which prior to the act permitted a showing of usage not to warrant
may still do soY' Also, such proof would rebut justifiable reliance
by the buyer on the seller. In addition to these reasons, the ques-
tion seems to be squarely covered in sec. 71 of the Sales Act
Where any right, duty or liability would arise under a
contract to sell or a sale by implication of law, it may be
negatived or varied by express agreement or by the course
of dealing between the parties, or by custom if the custom
be such as to bind both parties to the contract or the sale.
This language is broad enough to support proof of usage not to war
rant in a particular case.
The reason stated by those cases which have denied usage as a
means of establishing or destroying a warranty is that the result
is the contradiction of a recognized rule of law Doubtless it was
the object of this subsection to obviate that argument by placing
usage on a parity with other bases for the implication of warranty
This seems to have been lost sight of in a Maryland case3' decided
under the Sales Act, where it was held that a sale of goods under a
trade name precluded all possibility of warranty for a particular
purpose, and hence that proof of trade usage to warrant for such
purpose was not admissible. The result is to limit the operation of
this subsection to cases in which a warranty may be implied under
the other subsections, and then, of course, this subsection becomes
wholly unnecessary On this point Williston says -36
But if usage is ever to be given any effect it necessarily
changes the rule of law applicable to the case. It does this,
not by denying the rule, but by showing by usage, instead of
express words, an intent to bring the case under another
rule. If the parties intend to warrant, unquestionably
they may, the law does not forbid it. If there is no usage,
parties will naturally express their intention. If a well
recognized usage exists, instead of expressing their inten-
tion, they may properly take it for granted.
"4See DeStefano v. Assoctated Fruit Go., 318 Ill. 345, 149 N. E. 284(1925) Seattle Seed Go. v. Fujimor, 79 Wash. 123, 139 Pac. 866 (1914).
2Hubbarid Fertilizer Co. v. Amertcan Trona Corp., 142 Md. 246, 120
Atl. 522 (1923).
* Wn SToN ON SALEs, (2d ed.). sec. 246.
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Both on principle and on sound theories of interpretation this sub-
section should not be arbitrarily subordinated to any of the other
subsections.
EFFECT OF PRESENCE OF AN EXPRESS WARRANTY
No controversy should arise concerning the interpretation of sub-
section 6, which provides that the presence of an express warranty
shall not negative an implied warranty unless the two are incon-
sistent. This presents only a question of fact as to whether the two
are in a given case inconsistent.
MATTEPs NOT CovERED BY THE SALES ACT. Disci mER OF WARRANTY
Itis provided by sec. 73 of the Sales Act that matters not expressly
covered therein shall be governed by the general rules of law and
equity Consequently pre-existing authorities on such matters are
entitled to as much weight as if the Sales Act had never been
adopted, subject perhaps to the qualification that certain general
principles embodied in the act may be extended by inference to apply
to cases not specifically mentioned therein.
One quite important matter of which the Sales Act makes no
express mention is the right of the seller to disclaim liability on
warranty of any sort. That he has such a right there is no reason
to doubt, disclaimer at least destroys the right of the buyer to
rely on the seller as to those matters to which it refers, and thus cuts
out the very foundation of a warranty implied under the Sales Act.
To constitute an effective disclaimer, a statement made prior to or
at the time of the sale that the seller refuses to be liable on warranty,
express or implied, seems sufficient. Written disclaimers of war-
ranty accompanying bags of seed have been held sufficient in the
state of Washington, 37 but such disclaimer is effective only as to
the original purchaser and cannot be invoked by the latter as a
defense to a suit by one to whom he in turn sold the goods.38 Where
a warranty has already come into existence, a disclaimer by the
seller will not avoid it, nor will a disclaimer be effective if the seller
afterward substitutes other goods than those referred to by the dis-
claimer.3 9
THE EFFECT OF THE SALES ACT ON THE WASHINGTON CASES
By far the most radical change effected on the Washington law
uSeattle Seed Go. v: Fujimori; 79 Wash. 128, 139 Pac. 866 (1914)
Larson v. Inland Seeu Co., 143 Wash. 557, 255 Pac. 919 (1927).
' Jolly v. Blackwell, 122 Wash. 620, 211 Pac. 418 (1922).
30 Ward v. Valker, 44 N. D. 598, 176 N. W 129 (1920). See Bekkevold -v.
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of implied warranty of quality by the adoption of the Sales Act
is the abolition of all distinction between sales by manufacturers and
sales by dealers. In cases involving the latter class, the Washington
court has quite uniformly held that, in the absence of knowledge
of the defective nature of the goods, no warranty is to implied. Some
inconsistencies are to be found between the cases on this point as
will be hereinafter noted, but in the main the distinction has been
followed. Consequently the unequivocal language of subsections 1
and 2, wiping out such a distinction, has seriously impaired, if not
totally destroyed, the value of these cases as authority for future
cases.
The first case squarely dealing with this proposition is Ketchum
v. Stetson Post Miller Co.4" That case dealt with a sale of logs by a
person who had not cut them. The court held that the seller was
not liable for the damage resulting to the buyer from the presence
of iron in the wood. Knowledge on the part of the seller is declared
to be essential to liability on his part where he is not the original
producer of the goods. This rule is untenable under the Sales Act,
but it is possible that this case might still be decided the same way
on the ground that there was no justifiable reliance by the buyer
upon the seller's judgment.
The next case involving this point is Hurley Mason Co. v. Steb-
bns. 41 The Washington court has in the later decisions adopted
this case as the leading one recognizing a distinction between sales
by a manufacturer and sales by other persons. A quantity of cement
was sold subject to inspection by tests to be made by the buyer.
The seller was not the manufacturer. The cement was not tested
until after a considerable portion of it had been used and found
unsatisfactory Although the decision turns largely on the propo-
sition, undoubtedly correct, that the failure of the buyer to exercise
its opportunity and duty to inspect precluded any warranty as to
defects that such an inspection would have revealed, the fact that
the sale was made by a dealer is invoked in aid of the decision. In
a later paragraph the court seems to limit this distinction to the facts
Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N. W 790 (1927) for a strict view as to the re-
quirements for a disclaimer. The following provision in the contract was
held ineffective as to implied warranty of quality- "No warranties have
been made in reference to said motor vehicle by the seller to the buyer
unless expressly written hereon at the date of purchase."
33 Wash. 92, 73 Pac. 1127 (1903)
79 Wash. 366, 140 Pac. 381, L. R. A. 1915B, 1131, Ann. Cas. 1916A,
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of the case,42 but the subsequent cases have ignored this entirely
and accepted the rule first stated as one of general application.
Regardless of what limits the court intended to put on the rule
of this case, the plain language of the Sales Act entirely abolishing
such distinction makes the rule and its limitations equally unim-
portant as a precedent for future disputes.
The question arose again in Permne Machinery Co. v. Buck,4 3
where a dealer who was cognizant of all the facts told the buyer that
he needed a new impeller for his pump, and the buyer immediately
ordered one from the dealer, who in turn ordered it from the manu-
facturer. The new impeller proved to be entirely unsatisfactory for
the operation of the pump. The court held that there was no implied
warranty The facts bring the case squarely within the operation
of subsection 1, so the case may be regarded as overruled by the
adoption of the Sales Act. The case contains a statement that the
sale was one by sample, but there seems to be no foundation what-
soever for this in the facts as given.
In Hausken v. Hodson Feenaughty Co.,"4 the next case decided,
the court places a limitation on the broad distinction followed in the
earlier cases. A dealer sold a tractor to a farmer, knowing that it
was desired for special farm work. Without reference to the earlier
cases, the court held that the tractor was warranted fit for such
purposes. The fact that the buyer made known a very particular
purpose for which the machine was desired is the only basis for dis-
tinguishmg this case from the earlier ones, and even on such a basis
the case seems irreconcilable with Permne Machinery Co. v. Buck,
supra. The result is undoubtedly good law under the Sales Act, but
as already noted in the discussion of the first subsection, such a de-
tailed particularization is not necessary to establish a warranty
where the article itself has a definite and well known purpose. Thus
it is submitted that on the sale of a tractor to one known to be a
farmer raises a warranty that it shall be reasonably fit for the pur-
poses for which a tractor is commonly used by farmers, and that
a statement that the buyer wishes to put it to such a use is unneces-
sary
Perhaps the most important case overruled by the adoption of
"In this connection the court says: "It is probably true that, on a
sale even by a dealer without specific warranty and not subect to Inspec-
tion or test, there is an implied undertaking that the thing sold shall be
reasonably fit for the purpose intended, where that purpose is known to
the seller- "
" 90 Wash. 344, 155 Pac. 20 (1916)
"109 Wash. 606, 187 Pa. 319 (1920).
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the Sales Act is Hoyt v. Haynsworth Motor Co.45 The court there
held that a dealer who sold an Oldsmobile automobile did not war
rant freedom from latent defects. The main reason given is that
the seller was not the manufacturer, and the Hausken case is dis-
tingtushed on the basis of the detailed particularization of purpose
discussed in the preceding paragraph. Enough has already been
said to show that neither the reason given nor the distinction made
is tenable under the Sales Act. Certainly, by the cases decided
under the act, the buyer's known purpose of using the automobile
generally for pleasure and convenience is sufficiently a particular
purpose to raise a warranty under subsection 1.46 It is also said that
this was a sale of a known, defined and described article. On the
facts, this statement is open to question, but conceding its truth for
the sake of argument this would not preclude a warranty of mer
chantable quality which in this case would be identical with a war-
ranty for the buyer's particular purpose.
The remaining cases involving this question add nothing to those
already discussed. Long v. Five Hundred Co.4 expressly follows the
Hausken case,47a and is subject to the same criticism as has already
been directed at the latter case. Andrews & Son v. Harper8 reit-
erates the rule of Hoyt v. Haynsworth Motor Co., ,saand consequently
is not good law under the Sales Act. The most recent case, Gilpatrek
v. Downle,49 recognizes the distinction as announced in Ketchum v.
Stetson Post Mill Co.49a Both the Andrews and the Gilpatrck cases
were decided after the enactment of the Sales Act, but they are
expressly excepted from the operation of the act since the sales were
made prior to the enactment.5"
As an abstract proposition, the justice of the Sales Act rule mak-
ing the dealer as well as the manufacturer liable may at first glance
seem open to question. But since the buyer normally has no remedy
against the manufacturer, and the dealer is generally in a better
position to know the trustworthiness of the manufacturer with
whom he deals, the rule stated in the act is, in the last analysis, the
better one.
'112 Wash. 440, 192 Pac. 918 (1920).
4"Note 4, supra. Also see Petlalsks v. Winkel Garage Co., 190 Wis. 64,
208 N. W 893 (1926).
1123 Wash. 347, 212 Pac. 559 (1923)
"aNote 44, supra.
" 137 Wash. 353, 242 Pac. 27 (1926).
fa Note 45, supra.
49143 Wash. 671, 225 Pac. 1028 (1927).
'OaNote 40, supra.
wRem. Comp. Stat., 1927 Supp., see. 5836-76a.
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In other respects little change seems to have been wrought by
the act on the decided Washington cases. Sprzngfield Shingle (o. v.
Edgecomb51 contains dictum to the effect that an inspection by the
buyer will preclude warranty as to any defect (latent or obvious).
This, of course, has been changed by subsection 3.
The rule with regard to sales under patent or trade name has
quite generally been held to be the same as that announced by the
Sales Act.5 2 As has already been noted, however, an interpretation
inconsistent with the act was suggested in Hoyt v. Haynsworth
Motor o.,s2a and the cases following it. These cases would deny
the possibility of any warranty where the sale was under a trade
name.
The propriety of evidence of usage not to warrant is recognized
by the Washington court as has been previously noted in this arti-
cle.5 8
The Sales Act makes no distinction between sales of new and
second-hand articles as such. It has been held in Little v. Fynboh54
that a warranty of goods of the latter class may be implied, and tins
should remain the law under the Sales Act.
The adoption of the Sales Act probably overrules another Wash-
ington case of considerable importance.
In regard to the law of implied warranty of quality, sec. 15 desig-
nates the persons merely as "buyer" and "seller." There is no
express language making privity between the parties an essential
to a right of action for breach of warranty However, the act was
intended generally as a codification of the common law, and the re-
quirement of privity of contract as a basis of an action on a warranty
at the common law is too well settled as a general principle to neces-
sitate the citation of authority But the Washington court in
Mazetti v. Armour & Co. 5 recognized an exception to this rule. There
it was held that a subpurchaser of canned tongue, which contained
certain unwholesome and noxious substances, had a right of action
against the manufacturer. The court states in the opinion that the
general requirement of privity may be departed from (1) Where
the goods are of noxious and dangerous kind, (2) Where the original
seller is guilty of fraud, (3) Where the original seller is guilty of
--52 Wash. 620, 101 Pac. 233, 35 L. IL A. (n. s.) 258 (1909).5
"U. S. Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. Ellis, 117 Wash. 601, 201 Pac. 900 (1921)
Caldawell Bros. v. Coast Coal Co., 58 Wash. 461, 108 Pac. 1075" (1910).5 '
a Note 45; supra.
Seattle Seed Co. v. F.jimor, 79 Wash. 123, 139 Pac. 866 (1914).
120 Wash. 595, 207 Pac. 1064 (1922).
75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
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negligence. More specifically the case seems to have turned on the
fact that the goods were sold m a container, and consequently the
defect ascertainable only by the actual consumer. At the close of
the opinion, Justice Chadwick speaking for the court says
Our holding is that in the absence of an express warranty of
quality, a manufacturer of food products under modern
conditions impliedly warrants his goods when dispensed
in original packages, and that such warranty is available
to all who may be damaged by reason of their use in the
legitimate channels of trade.
It is difficult to understand why either the latent character of defect
or the fact that the goods are food products would justify a de-
parture from the genera] rule. The result of the case is doubtless
satisfactory in that it does away with the necessity for several suits,
substituting a single one in their stead. This argument, however,
may be advanced in any case where subpurchasers are involved, and
consequently does not lend support to the limited rule announced in
this case. That it is so limited has been recognized in later Wash-
ington cases,56 and so the law stood at the time the Sales Act was
adopted. Mention has been made earlier in this article to the fact
that matters not covered by the act are to be decided according to the
common law, but this rule cannot well operate so as to sustain a war
ranty, since the introductory paragraph of see. 15 purports to make
its provisions exclusive as to the implication of warranties. Con-
sidering the entire section, there seems little doubt that it was in-
tended to affect only buyers and sellers standing in direct contrac-
tual relation to each other. In this light the Mazetts case is nulli-
fied.5 T
Both in connection with the case just discussed and as an original
proposition it is to be noted that the distinction which obtained at
the early common law between sales of food and other goods finds
no support in the Sales Act, whe the term "goods" is used in the
'Peregrine v. West Seattle Bank, 120 Wash. 653, 208 Pac. 35 (1922)
Jolly v. Blackwell, 122 Wash. 620, 211 Pac. 418 (1922).
1 In this connection see: Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N. Y. 468, 139
N. E. 576, 27 A. L. R. 1533(1923) Abererombie 'v. Union Portland Cement
Co., 35 Idaho 231, 205 Pac. 1118 (1922). These cases merely deny the
existence of a warranty available to subpurchaser- the liability of a
manufacturer for injuries sustained because of his negligence in making
the article is in no way affected. For a proper case for the application of
the latter doctrine see MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111
N. E. 1050, Ann. Cas. 1916 C. 440, L. R. A. 1916 F 696 (1916)
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broadest sense. In Flessher v. Carstens Packzng Co.,58 the Wash-
ington court seems to recognize such a distinction, while the result
reached in that case remains good law at the present time, the dis-
tinction mentioned is no longer of any consequence.
CONCLUSION
As its name suggests, the chief aim of the Uniform Sales Act is to
bring the law of the different jurisdictions into conformity as to the
matters which it covers. To effect this purpose the following rule
of construction was incorporated into the act :"
Tins act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effec-
tuate its general purpose to make uniform the laws of those
states which enact it.
Thins section removes all doubts as to the right and duty of the Su-
preme Court of the state of Washington to follow those cases in
England and America which seem to give the soundest interpreta-
tion to the provisions of the act, even though such a course may abol-
ish or alter local doctrines of long standing. It is unfortunate but
true that certain of the subsections considered in this article are
so drawn as to admit of wide differences of interpretation. Such a
result can'be obviated only by giving due regard to the principles
already developed elsewhere. It is submitted that the views set
forth in the present discussion are in consonance with such of those
principles as are based on the best authorities, and that they should
serve as the basis for the future law of this state.
J. GORDON GOSE.*
c493 Wash. 48, 160 Pac. 14 (1916).
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